The UN regulations (2011) require that DC be authorised by a competent authority before loading and offloading of the cargo. This helps in ensuring that all safety requirements stay observed in order to avoid accidents. The regulations stipulate all forms of preparations that should be put in place prior to loading and offloading DC. These include temperature compliance, freeing the area of any harmful objects and maintaining the pressure of containerised goods. The regulations further require that only competent and authorised personnel must load and offload DC. The loader is expected to comply with specific requirements concerning compatibility and segregation depending on the class of the DC being loaded or off-loaded. The regulations further require the loader to hand over the DC to the carrier only if they are authorised to transport such cargo (UN 2011). The regulations have been supported by scientific literature. For instance, Martins et al. (2016) emphasised the need for strict construction rules when constructing DC loading infrastructure, DC control systems and the use of ‘specialised and trained crew’. Sukmanee, Kesvarakul and Janthong (2019) reiterate the need for risk prioritisation and the significance of following a sequential approach to loading and offloading DC.

Mangan et al. (2008) define in-port transportation as the movement of cargo from one point to another within the port area. This can involve transportation from the vessel to the storage point, or vice-versa. It also includes transportation within the port waters (Loh & Thai 2015). The incorrect handling of HRC during in-port transportation may result in collisions within the port waters (Loh & Thai 2015), and accidents within the port area (He et al. 2011), resulting in water pollution and spillages on the ground surface. This will ultimately result in the destruction of the port environment.

Packaging helps in protecting the product before consuming it. Because of the many handling operations during long supply chains, many products require stability and protection (Ellis 2011). Packaging and repackaging are becoming increasingly important because of the escalating integration of seaports into supply chains and that has resulted in the need for the provision of such value-added services (Loh & Thai 2015). At the same time, all these handling operations need time, and packages help to aggregate small freight units to reduce the quantity of handling operations and, afterwards, to reduce the ultimate cost for the customers. With regards to packaging and repackaging HRC, special instructions should be followed (Ellis 2011). Improper packaging, incorrect labelling and container stuffing have been considered to be some of the key contributors to DC releases on-board.

The UN Regulations have classified DC into nine classes in accordance with the type or nature of hazard involved in the cargo (IMO 2018; UN 2011). The UN regulations on DGs call for proper segregation of such goods according to the descriptions given for each of the nine classes. In 1974, the IMO spearheaded the ratification of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), a convention that is internationally recognised in regulating the handling and transportation of DC (Liu et al. 2019; Zekos 2000). The IMDG code (IMO 2018) provides for a detailed explanation of how specific types of goods, packages or containers should be segregated. The code, which is amended every two years (IMO 2018), also provides for the appropriate codes, symbols and terms used in the securement and segregation of HRC. These must be followed strictly to avoid and/or minimise avoidable hazards.

Even though the terms ‘storage’ and ‘stowage’ have generally been confused, their meaning and usage in maritime logistics is quite distinctive. Whilst storage relates to the safe-keeping of goods, usually in a warehouse or any other designated storage place (Wilson, Roach & Ware 2001), stowage is mostly used to refer to storage or securement of goods in a vessel for transportation purposes (Batarlienė 2018; Ding & Chou 2015). The IMDG code provides guidelines which must be followed for the stowage of HRC, materials or substances, both from within and from out of the port area (IMO 2018). The code also outlines the stowage categories for the different DGs classes, thus providing for the need for segregation as explained earlier.

It is not enough to simply have the appropriate package and to follow the correct packaging or repackaging procedures. There is need for appropriate marking, labelling and documentation of the cargo, and this is particularly significant in the case of HRC. All parties involved in the handling and transportation chain of goods must know the nature of the goods with which they are dealing (Ots 2000). According to the IMDG Code (2016 edn.) (IMO 2018), there is also a need to place appropriate placards marked with the correct international UN numbers allocated for different cargo from different DGs classes. The IMDG code calls for appropriate documentation, labelling and marking, as this helps, especially in cases of emergency where the response crew may have to take certain precautionary measures in responding to the emergency.

Over the years, seaports have come to be understood as ‘logistics centres’ that integrate inland and maritime transport with the industrial, commercial, regional and the logistics and distribution functions (Montwiłł 2014). In order to fulfil these functions, there are several activities, processes and/or terminal facilities that take place within the port area, and each of these requires some appropriate infrastructure attributes if the desired economic benefits are to be fully obtained from the seaport (Tsinker 2014). For instance, it is common knowledge that containerisation has radically changed the infrastructural requirements of seaports (Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack 2016). With containerisation also come bigger ships requiring improved seaport handling infrastructure. These views mostly relate to the general port handling equipment. Specialised equipment might therefore be required for handling DC. Although HRC is more exposed to accidents during handling and transportation (Darbra & Casal 2004), it is essential that storage infrastructures are planned in a manner that helps to preserve port employees’ lives and the safety of the cargo handled (Wallace & Webber 2017). The use of inappropriate and/or outdated port equipment has been labelled as one of the causes of port accidents, and hence disruptions (Rodrigue et al. 2016). It is therefore critical to make use of the correct equipment to avoid disruptions at the seaports.

The current study predicts that most seaports in developing economies such as Namibia, have been found to be lacking such equipment – an issue that has to be arrested urgently if the envisaged port competitiveness is to be achieved (Zhang & Roe 2019). The above views related to the general port handling equipment imply an even worse scenario for specialised equipment for handling DC. This study thus hypothesises that:

Almost three decades ago, Rubin (1991) established four phases of emergency management, namely, mitigation (pre-disaster), preparedness (pre-disaster), response (disaster), and recovery (post-disaster). These phases have different information and time requirements. Of these four phases, Berke, Kartez and Wenger (1993) argue that the recovery phase was the least understood. However, more recent studies have ruled this out by proposing procedural methodologies for disaster recovery (Smith, Martin & Wenger 2018). Whilst there seems to be a host of studies on emergency management, it is the knowledge of such mitigation and emergency procedures that really matters in ensuring effective HRC logistics. It is also important to note that disaster management remains the responsibility of everyone within the port area and such responsibility is even extended to the surrounding communities in order to attain what Pearce (2003) terms ‘sustainable hazard mitigation’.

This study supports the views of Kunz, Reiner and Gold (2014), who advocate for firms to invest in disaster management abilities. Based on the disaster response (Callaghan 2016) and chaos (Koehler, Kress & Miller 2014) theories, the current study is of the view that such investments should focus primarily on pre-disaster phases of mitigation and preparedness. This led to the hypothesis that:

The preceding factor emphasised the need for knowledge of risk mitigation and emergency procedures. Such knowledge does not come on its own, hence Gusik et al. (2012) have emphasised the need for training of personnel responsible for handling HRC. With the new ‘logistics centre’ role of modern-day seaports (Montwiłł 2014), it is important that seaport personnel have the essential proficiencies required to achieve port efficiency (Chang & Thai 2016). The efficiency and effectiveness of human capital contributes not only to port performance, but also to the manner in which port challenges can be tackled.

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2018) notes that there has been a radical shift in the skills development and requirements for ports worldwide. The organisation also notes that due to the increasing need for a skills framework for constantly-changing port job profiles, there has been a shift from job analysis to competency-based training (ILO 2018). The UN (2012) notes that the handling of HRC specifically requires personnel who have been trained to handle such cargoes. This clause is also noted by the IMDG code (IMO 2018). The current study further envisages that such training will also enhance the level of knowledge of risk mitigation and emergency procedures. Despite this requirement, this study predicts that seaports still violate these requirements in handling HRC, hence the hypothesis:

Effective HRC logistics is also influenced by documentation. There is a need for adequate and correct documentation (Santis & Marcicano 2020). Slight discrepancies may prevent the shipment or transhipment of the cargo, and may result in non-payments as well as challenges with the customs officials (House 2015). The UN regulations on DGs are also quite clear regarding the need for precise documentation and labelling (UN 2011).

Appropriate documentation helps, especially in cases of emergency where the response crew may have to take certain precautionary measures in response to the emergency. For instance, the fire extinguishing material for gasoline varies significantly from the extinguishing materials and procedures for a fire caused by kerosene, even though both products fall under Class 3: Flammable liquids (IMO 2018). Precise documentation thus enhances the effective handling and transportation procedures by the succeeding players involved in the transportation chain of the merchandise (Liu et al. 2019). Whilst the focus of the current literature and regulations has been on documentation, this study focuses on an understanding of the documents, hence the hypotheses:

In support of Mullai (2006), Frémont (2008) puts much emphasis on the need for national, regional, international and global legislature. Due to their hazardous nature, DCs are governed and regulated by international organisations such as the UN, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the ILO (Santis & Marcicano 2020; UN 2011). Mullai (2006) posits that regulatory frameworks have been formulated to control all aspects of maritime logistics, including transportation, health and safety, operational and technical factors. Dangerous goods regulations have thus been categorised based on the geographical scope, legal effects (i.e. binding and non-binding), DC activities, transport modes and carriage form (Mullai 2006; Ots 2000).

Besides the UN global regulations whose applicability is uniform globally (UN 2011), some countries have developed their national regulatory requirements for both imports and exports into and out of their territories. The expectation is that both global and national regulations be adopted when handling DC at local ports. For instance, Wang, Chen and Wu (2015) suggest that the United States implemented a federal regulation requiring their local international ports to implement what they term ‘Non-Intrusive Imaging (NII)’ as well as ‘radiation detection’ for all in-bound vessels, following the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act passed in 2007. However, in their cross-sectional study, Wang et al. (2015) conclude that this United States law has reportedly caused delays across many seaports in the country, thus impacting the entire transport and supply chain of the merchandise. The authors further posit that, prior to the overall effect on the supply chain, the adherence or non-adherence of the operational regulatory framework has a potential impact on the effectiveness of DC handling within the port.

In line with UN regulations on handling DC, Popek (2019) emphasised the need to train the personnel charged with handling HRC. Based on the ‘logistics centre’ role of global seaports (Montwiłł 2014), Thai (2016:49) recommends the need to train and develop seaport personnel handling HRC so that they can have ‘the essential proficiencies required in achieving port efficiency’. In support of Wang et al. (2015), Lam and Lassa (2017) emphasise the need to train DC personnel in regulatory adherence. Based on the above literature arguments, the study hypothesises that:

The human element is a critical factor as it interferes with all other elements of the maritime logistics (Min 2012). A study by Ots (2000) established that a considerable number of accidents in ports are caused by human errors and failures. Rothblum (2004) supports this view and has classified human error into incorrect decision-making, improper performance of tasks, and inaction. In view of these facts, Fabiano et al. (2010) rather attributed recognition of several human elements to port safety; elements such as situational awareness, proper communication and instruction interpretations, good health, effective management of work, and personal pressure (stress) issues. In addition, John et al. (2014) argued that the totality of an assessment of seaport operational risks is only complete with the inclusion of human elements – a view further expanded by Molero et al. (2017) in their ‘total safety by design’ contributions in increasing the safety and operability of DC terminals.

Fabiano et al’s. (2010) study concluded that the container revolution has not improved safety conditions in seaports as the human factors have not been impacted by the revolution. More recently, Molero et al. (2017), in support of Pak et al. (2015), resonated the same view, adding the captain’s perspective that human elements do indeed impact port safety. All these views, however, do not specify the relationship of such human elements to HRC handling environments – a gap that the current study intended to fill by predicting the relationship between human elements and effective DC handling. Based on this, the study thus hypothesises that:

Based on their experiences with their respective ports, respondents were asked to indicate their opinions regarding the level of influence of the factors in Table 2 on the effectiveness of HRC logistics. Responses were rated on a five-point Likert scale of Very Low (VL), Low (L), Not Sure (NS), High (H) or Very High (VH). The findings follow.

The results in Table 2 indicate that all of the factors indicated influenced the effective handling of HRC. The use of appropriate port equipment and infrastructure tops the list, with 96% of the respondents indicating that this factor had high to very high influence on the effectiveness of HRC logistics. Port technology utilisation came second, with 89% of the respondents indicating that it had a high to very high influence. Other notable factors included training and development (71%), human elements (70%) and strict adherence to national and international regulations (66%).

The results were also qualitatively confirmed by the key informant interviewees, whose shared views were that an incident-free port could only be ensured through the use of appropriate and up-to-date port equipment and infrastructure, utilisation of the latest port technologies and continuous training programmes, amongst many other factors. One particular interviewee had this to say:

The above results all confirmed the view of Darbra and Casal (2004), whose study emphasised the need for appropriate technical equipment and infrastructure, whilst Chang and Thai (2016) and Gusik et al. (2012) emphasised the importance of training and developing personnel responsible for handling HRC. Whilst the determinants of HRC are fragmented in literature, the findings of this study document and put together the determinant factors for future studies.

However, a marginal majority of 50% of the respondents rated high to very high for adequate and correct documentation, and 48% for independence of regulatory framework. An average of 46% of the respondents were of the view that these two factors had low to very low influence of the effectiveness of HRC logistics. This confirms the view by Wang et al. (2015) that a regulatory framework on its own does not warrant effective DC logistics. It is either adherence or violation of the regulations and information on the documents that will have an impact on the effectiveness of the logistics procedures (Frittelli 2008; IMO 2018; Zhang & Roe 2019).

Based on their experience with their respective ports, respondents were asked to indicate the level of influence of the factors that were thought to be hindering the effectiveness of HRC logistics, as guided by literature. Table 3 summarises the findings from the study.

Whilst results in Table 1 showed the facilitating factors of effective HRC logistics, the results in Table 3 imply that the lack of, inadequacy or violation of the facilitating factors hinder the effectiveness thereof. For instance, 87% of the respondents rated poor traffic management as having a high to very high influence, followed by the use of inappropriate equipment and infrastructure (86%) and poor port technology utilisation (85%). All of the other factors were also rated as having a relatively high negative influence on the effectiveness of HRC logistics. A marginal majority of 50%, that rated ‘inadequate and incorrect documentation’ as having a high to very high influence was not surprising, given the controversies that still emerge, even in literature regarding the impact of the adequacy and/or violation of documentation and regulations (Frittelli 2008). Despite this controversy that was confirmed by the study’s findings, the rest of the findings confirmed the isolated literature’s views regarding the factors impeding the effectiveness of HRC logistics – including the use of inappropriate or inadequate equipment and infrastructure (Loh & Thai 2015), violation of national and international regulations (Frittelli 2008), lack of training (Cao & Meng 2017), human errors and failures (Pak et al. 2015), and poor port traffic management (Niavis & Tsekeris 2012), amongst other impeding factors.